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Abstract 
WPA2 Enterprise is a suite of protocols for secure communication in a wireless local network and 
has become an essential component of virtually every enterprise. In many practical deployments of 
this technology, a device that authenticates with username and password is at risk of leaking 
credentials to fraudulent access points claiming to be the enterprise network (​evil twins​) that may 
be placed virtually anywhere. While this kind of vulnerability is well known to practitioners, we 
believe these issues deserve a fresh look because the current technological landscape has 
magnified the corresponding risks. Convergence of organizations toward single sign-on 
architectures in which a single set of credentials unlock access to ​all ​services of the organizations, 
coupled with the huge diffusion of wifi-enabled personal devices which often contain enterprise 
credentials and that connect to wifi networks ​automatically​, have made attacks aimed at stealing 
network credentials particularly attractive to attackers and hard to detect. In this paper we intend to 
draw the attention of the research and technological community on this important yet, in our 
opinion, widely underestimated risk. We also suggest a direction for investigating practical 
solutions able to offer stronger security without requiring any overhaul of existing protocols. 
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1 Introduction 
WPA2 Enterprise is a suite of protocols for secure communication in a wireless local network and 
has become an essential component of virtually every enterprise. The framework is based on three 
different entities: user device that communicates via wireless link (Supplicant); wireless access 
point (Authenticator); server that stores user credentials (Authentication Server). Each user is 
provided with personalized credentials for authenticating to the network and authentication may 
occur with a variety of protocols. Successful connection ensures secrecy, integrity and mutual 
authentication of the wireless traffic between Supplicant and Authenticator. 
 
While the message flow depends on the specific combination of authentication protocols used, the 
overall exchange follows a common pattern. The Authentication Server sends the Supplicant a 
certificate binding the name of the server to a public key. Then, the Supplicant proves knowledge 
of the user credentials with a message exchange occurring within a TLS tunnel built upon the 
public key in the received certificate. We emphasize that the certificate does not bind a public key 
to the name of the wireless network (i.e., to its SSID), only to the DNS name of the Authentication 
Server. 
 
1 Corresponding author: http://bartoli.inginf.units.it 
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An out of the box Supplicant cannot connect securely to a given SSID with WPA2 Enterprise, 
unless the user knows the DNS name of the Authentication Server and checks that the certificate 
sent in the early stage of the authentication protocol is signed by a trusted CA and contains that 
name. Indeed, there are a number of simple means for a rogue access point to claim to be the 
target SSID and provide a certificate that will be validated by the Supplicant automatically (e.g., 
[Y13,SH13,M13]). For this reason, WPA2 Enterprise Supplicants must be properly configured 
before ​connecting to the target SSID [SS12]. The nature of such configuration depends on the 
authentication protocols available and its objective consists, essentially, in binding the SSID to the 
certificate of the Authentication Server, making it impossible for the Supplicant to accept other 
certificates for that SSID. 
 
The requirement for secure configuration of a Supplicant before connecting to a WPA2 Enterprise 
network is well known and the attacks that can be carried out when such a requirement is not 
fulfilled are well known as well (an excellent synthesis can be found, e.g., in [WWW15]). However, 
we believe that these issues deserve a fresh look because the current technological landscape has 
magnified the risks associated with ​evil twins​, i.e., with rogue access points that claim to be 
associated with an enterprise SSID. 
 
First, convergence of modern organizations toward single sign on (SSO) architectures in which 
credentials for wireless network authentication usually unlock access to ​all ​enterprise services, 
makes attacks aimed at stealing network credentials particularly attractive. Second, the fact that 
virtually every enterprise user is now permanently carrying a personal wifi-enabled smartphone 
which often contains the user’s enterprise credentials and connect to wifi networks ​automatically​, 
makes those attacks very simple to execute and very difficult to detect. The reason is because an 
evil twin (ET) may trick a device into initiating an authentication protocol execution easily and, as 
we shall illustrate in more detail later, even a failed protocol execution often suffices to leak 
credential material to the attacker. The crucial observation is that attacks of this kind may be 
executed automatically, in less than a second of proximity to an ET, and without any need of 
involving the device owner in a working session. It follows that these attacks may occur even 
outside of the enterprise and potentially anywhere: the ET may quickly elicit credential material 
from the device and then disconnect immediately. Furthermore, the ET does not even need any 
Internet connectivity. Preventing client-owned devices of enterprise users to fall prey of these 
attacks requires a mix of careful user education, correct user behavior and suitable configuration of 
user devices: a combination very hard to obtain in practice. The resulting scenario could make 
WPA2 Enterprise prone to a widespread security disaster soon. 
 
In this paper we intend to draw the attention of the research and technological community on this 
important yet, in our opinion, widely underestimated risk. We also suggest a direction for 
investigating practical solutions able to offer stronger security without requiring any overhaul of 
existing protocols. 
 
An important class of organizations included in our analysis are the research and educational 
institutions belonging to the eduroam network, which is a roaming access service allowing 
members of participating institutions to obtain Internet connectivity at any other participating 
institution. In 2016, eduroam provided over 2.6 billion authentications of roaming users in the same 
country and over 592 million cross-border authentications 
(​https://www.eduroam.org/2017/03/07/2016-a-record-breaking-year-for-eduroam/​). Eduroam 
connectivity is increasingly available even outside of campuses of participating institutions through 
hot-spots at city centers, commercial malls, airports and railway stations and so on: tens of 
thousands of locations in more than 85 countries world-wide 
(​https://www.eduroam.org/case-studies/​). Essentially, eduroam provides a secure infrastructure for 
enabling Supplicants to execute the WPA2 Enterprise authentication protocol with the 
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Authentication Server of their home institution rather than with the Authentication Server of the 
institution they happen to be [MW12, WWW15]. To this end, Authentication Servers of participating 
institutions route authentication messages within the TLS tunnel established between a Supplicant 
and its home Authentication Server. 
 
It is useful to place our attack scenario in perspective with respect to the recently discovered 
KRACK vulnerability in WPA2 [VP17]. KRACK allows an attacker in range of a WPA2 network to 
perform arbitrary packet decryption and, in most network configurations, arbitrary packet injection. 
The impact of KRACK depends on the protocols used for the wifi payload and may include loss of 
confidentiality as well as TCP connection hijacking. KRACK does ​not ​allow the attacker to obtain 
WPA2 credentials, nor does it allow the attacker to obtain wifi encryption keys. KRACK exploits 
weaknesses of the WPA2 standard, thus any correct implementation of the standard was likely 
affected at the time KRACK was disclosed . In this work we are concerned with a very different 2
scenario. First, we consider attacks that do not occur while in range of an enterprise network: an 
ET may placed anywhere. Neither the attacker nor the ET need to have ever been in range of the 
enterprise network. Second, we consider attacks aimed at stealing WPA2 credentials. Finally, we 
consider attacks that may only affect Supplicants that are not configured correctly. Our scenario is 
thus complementary to the one relevant to KRACK. 
2 Supplicant configuration 
Supplicants, i.e., user devices that connect to a WPA2 Enterprise network, must be configured with 
the ​network profile ​for the target SSID, that is, they must be provided with a set of rules enforced 
by the networking software for binding the SSID of the network to the Authentication Server of that 
network. 
 
In principle, only Supplicants configured with the correct network profile should be used in a WPA2 
Enterprise environment, because Supplicants that are not configured correctly are prone to several 
security vulnerabilities [SS12,WWW15]. For example, an ET could impersonate the target SSID 
and provide a certificate that is validated automatically by the Supplicant because certificates bind 
a public key to a server name, rather than to a SSID. In that case a Supplicant that contains 
networking credentials and connects to the target SSID automatically, will send credential material 
to the ET without any involvement of the user (WPA2 Enterprise authentication will be described in 
more detail in the next sections, along with the corresponding attacks).  
 
In practice, ensuring that Supplicants indeed install the correct network profile may be costly and 
difficult, especially in organizations with hundreds or thousands of users such as, e.g., universities. 
Indeed, according to a recent survey among 880 IT professionals of organizations allowing 
enterprise usage of personal devices (Bring Your Own Device, BYOD), 23% of organizations 
offered no technical support and leave users responsible for configuring and supporting their 
personal devices; 27% offer some limited support and 32% offer a best-effort support without any 
formal process or capabilities [C16]. Although BYOD support is a much broader theme than mere 
connectivity to the enterprise network, the overall issue is evident. 
 
A crucial problem is that Supplicants may connect to an enterprise wireless network even without 
installing the correct network profile. What often happens is that users insert their enterprise 
credentials in the personal devices, select the SSID of the enterprise network and then play with 
the network configuration until connecting, perhaps instructing their devices to skip certificate 
validation (an option available in almost all operating systems). According to a recent survey 
among students at a research University in Russia, more than 40% of participants adopt exactly 
2 Further information may be found also at ​https://www.krackattacks.com/​ and 
https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/228519/  
3 
this behavior [Y16]. Anecdotal evidence leads us to believe that for many institutions, including 
ours, the percentage of Supplicants which skip certificate validation is much higher. 
 
Discouraging unsafe practices by allowing connections only from Supplicants that are configured 
with the correct network profile is usually not possible: successful authentication of a Supplicant 
with the legitimate authentication server typically does not allow the latter to infer whether the 
network profile of the former is configured correctly. It follows that the security properties of the 
network connection critically depend on the collaboration of end users, which should be educated 
to not even ​attempt ​a connection before configuring their devices properly. Most importantly, these 
security properties cannot be enforced automatically for misbehaving users. 
 
Adopting a security policy in the enterprise that forbids such insecure practices is important but 
cannot be the only solution, because users can hardly appreciate the risks involved in connecting 
without installing the correct network profile. In this respect, we may also observe that wireless 
connection at home does not require any specific configuration on client devices other than 
password insertion; and, that the need of providing personalized credentials does enforce a feeling 
of security. Indeed, according to a survey by Microsoft, 24% of respondents use their personal 
devices in the workplace even in organizations that explicitly ban the use of those devices, while a 
further 23% use their personal devices in the absence of any specific policy or without even 
knowing whether such a policy exists [J12]. 
 
Many organizations are not particularly restrictive concerning usage of personal devices, though. 
According to a recent survey in 500 US companies with more than 1000 employees, half of the 
organizations that support or mandate usage of personal devices do not have a formal policy for 
their usage [BL16]. Another recent survey in companies with more than 100 employees led to 
similar results [S16]. It is also important to remark that we observed user guides for eduroam 
connectivity at several institutions which do not require any automatic installation of an approved 
network profile and instruct users to select such options as “do not validate the certificate”. Such 
choices do not violate the eduroam policy because user devices are only required to support at 
least one of the EAP protocols capable of mutual authentication [MW12]. 
 
In summary, although personal devices should be properly configured before​ ​connecting to the 
enterprise wireless network, very often this is not the case in practice. Rather than blaming users 
and/or organizations and dismissing this fact as a bad practice that should be avoided, we believe 
that this issue should be considered as a reality and that we should understand its implications.  
2.1 WPA2 Enterprise authentication 
WPA2 is a large suite of protocols. We provide only the necessary background and focus on the 
configurations most commonly used for authentication in enterprise wireless networks. We refer 
the reader to the abundant literature on the subject for full details, e.g., [FEOS07]. WPA2 
Enterprise authentication protocols are EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and PEAP. In EAP-TLS user 
credentials consist of a private-public key pair and a certificate binding the user identity to that 
public key. If an organization can afford to deploy EAP-TLS and enforce its usage across all client 
devices, then the issues discussed in this work are not relevant. The reason is because, with 
EAP-TLS, the Supplicant proves knowledge of a private key and does not send any password or 
token, thus tricking the Supplicant into executing the authentication protocol with an ET cannot 
leak any credential information to the attacker. On the other hand, deploying EAP-TLS in a large 
organization is difficult and costly due to the problems involved in key and certificate management 
for Supplicants. In the following we shall consider only organizations based on either EAP-TTLS or 
PEAP and such that user credentials consist of a pair username-password. We are not aware of 
any statistics quantifying the portion of WPA2 Enterprise deployments that fall in this category, but 
it is fair to claim that such a setting is indeed very common.  
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With both EAP-TTLS and PEAP, execution of the authentication protocol occurs in two phases, as 
follows (see also Figure 1). In Phase 1, the Supplicant declares the user identity for the advertised 
SSID and the Authentication Server responds with a certificate binding the name of the server to a 
public key. Then, in Phase 2, the Supplicant proves knowledge of the user credentials with a 
message exchange occurring within a TLS tunnel built upon the public key in the received 
certificate. Both EAP-TTLS and PEAP are compound protocols able to transport a variety of 
different authentication protocols within the TLS tunnel, e.g., MSCHAPv2. Depending on the 
specific protocol used in Phase 2, the Supplicant may send either the password or a hash of the 
password; and, the Authentication Server may or may not prove knowledge of the user credentials 
to the Supplicant. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Logical view of EAP-TTLS and PEAP execution, i.e., the drawing outlines the information exchange 
rather than the actual message exchange. Traffic between Supplicant and authenticator occurs on a wireless 
link. The “Outcome” arrows indicate the logical points in which the Supplicant may terminate execution: A, 
when the Supplicant does not validate the certificate; B, when the Supplicant has sent credential material but 
has not authenticated the Authentication Server; C, when the Supplicant completes the protocol execution 
successfully. 
2.2 Attack objective 
We consider attacks aimed at eliciting credential material, i.e, tricking the Supplicant to execute the 
authentication protocol with an ET. Network credentials are highly valuable because in many 
organizations the same credentials unlock access to all internal services. For example, at our 
University, access to the wireless network, to the web application for grading exams, to e-mail, to 
the web application for management of research projects and budgets and so on, are all unlocked 
by the same set of credentials. 
 
We are concerned with attacks executed by an ET that remains in close proximity of a Supplicant 
for a short time, while the Supplicant is not connected to other wireless networks. The typical 
scenario for these attacks consists of users which carry devices configured for connecting to the 
wireless enterprise network automatically and move across regions not covered by that network, in 
particular, outside of the enterprise. Techniques for enabling an ET to connect to Supplicants even 
in regions in coverage of the enterprise network can be found, e.g., in [ARKN13]. The cited work 
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includes the design and implementation of a jamming device with a cost of around 3500 USD and 
capable of neutralizing the signal of the legitimate access points for the targeted Supplicant. 
 
We remark that the objective of our attack is ​not​ enabling the ET to operate as a 
man-in-the-middle, i.e., inspecting and possibly modifying the traffic to/from the Supplicant. 
Man-in-the-middle attacks require Internet connectivity and, most importantly, they generally 
require the ability to engage the user in a working session. Such attacks do not fit the scenario of 
our concern, in which a device remains in close proximity with an ET for a very short time and 
potentially anywhere. 
 
To clarify our scope further, we consider the classification of ET scenarios proposed in [LPPE14]: 
Replacement​, when the legitimate access point is switched off and replaced by the ET at the same 
location; ​Coexistence​, when the ET coexist with a legitimate access point at the same location; 
Remote clone​, when the ET is at a location where there is no legitimate access point; ​Ad hoc 
clone​, like remote clone except that in this case the ET claims to be any SSID at which Supplicants 
attempt to connect. Although the attacks that we consider could be suitable also for the 
Replacement and Coexistence scenarios, in this work we focus only on the Remote clone and Ad 
hoc clone scenarios, with special emphasis on ETs placed at locations that have nothing to do with 
the enterprise. 
 
Once a Supplicant has initiated an execution of the authentication protocol, actual transmission of 
credential material to the Authentication Server may or may not occur depending on whether the 
Supplicant validates the certificate received at the end of Phase 1. In detail, the possible outcomes 
of an execution of the authentication protocol may be categorized as follows (see the “Outcome” 
arrows in Figure 1): 
A. Supplicant does not validate the certificate, hence it terminates execution without sending 
any credential information. 
B. Supplicant validates the certificate, sends credential information within the TLS tunnel but 
terminates execution without authenticating the Authentication Server. 
C. Supplicant completes both Phase 1 and Phase 2 successfully. 
 
When a Supplicant enters in range of an ET, the Supplicant may or may not initiate an execution of 
the authentication protocol depending on several factors, including whether the ET is advertising a 
SSID that triggers automatic connection at the Supplicant, the signal strength of the ET and the 
presence of other signals for the same SSID from other access points. The scenario of our concern 
corresponds to an ET placed outside of the enterprise, in which case user devices with the wifi 
interface active will most likely initiate an execution of the authentication protocol. The outcome of 
the execution may be either A, or B, or C, as discussed in the next section. We will consider an 
attack successful when the outcome is either B or C. In these cases the attacker may have 
obtained either a password or a hash of the password, depending on the protocol configuration 
and on the Supplicant. Of course, if the attacker has obtained only a hash of the password, the 
attacker will have to execute a further offline guessing. Whether the attacker will manage to 
actually obtain the password will depend on the password itself [B12], on the guessing strategy 
[DZWYH16,JYHHLB17] and on the amount of computing resources devoted to the guessing 
[ARKN13]. However, we believe that the pessimistic standpoint is more appropriate to our analysis 
and chose to consider the attack successful even if the attacker has obtained only a hash of the 
password. 
 
Note that the requirements for an ET able to execute these attacks may be satisfied quite easily: 
Internet connectivity is not required; battery power may be used; credential material may be stored 
on a flash card (the ET may disconnect from the Supplicant immediately after completing the 
authentication protocol). 
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3 What can be obtained with a simple ET? 
In order to provide a concrete evaluation of the risk level associated with widely used Supplicants, 
we executed a systematic campaign aimed at: (i) assessing the practical feasibility of simple 
attacks with widely available software and cheap equipment; and, (ii) determining the behavior of 
different operating systems when exposed to an ET pretending to be the enterprise SSID. We 
worked in collaboration with the technical people responsible for the networking infrastructure of 
our University, with the objective of assessing our IT security. 
 
In detail: 
● We implemented an ET on a Raspberry PI running Kali Linux (cost approx. 40 euros) and a 
wireless USB adapter (cost approx. 10 euros) (Figure 2). We used hostapd-wpe and 
freeRadius-WPE, free packages available in Kali Linux which may be configured to 
implement the Authenticator and Authentication Server of IEEE 802.1X and log the 
credentials of any user with which they interact.  
● We executed our experiments in a region not covered by the legitimate network, in order to 
replicate the attack scenario in which the ET is located outside of the enterprise. 
● We considered only Supplicants which were exposed to the ET ​after ​having connected to 
the legitimate network, in order to make the analysis more realistic. In other words, 
Supplicants have had the opportunity of receiving the full legitimate certificate chain of the 
Authentication Server. Unless specified otherwise, all Supplicants were under our full 
control. 
● We examined both Supplicants with and without the correct network profile installed. In the 
latter case, we attempted to emulate the approach that is simplest to users. To this end, we 
provided the Supplicant with the minimal information necessary for connecting, i.e., 
username and password without any further configuration information. With Linux and 
Android Supplicants the default configuration made connection impossible, thus in these 
cases we choose the only path available through the user interface that enables 
connecting, which consists in checking the checkbox “do not validate the certificate” . 3
● We considered Supplicants running the following operating systems: Android 4.4.4, 5.1, 6, 
7; Linux Debian 8, Linux Ubuntu 16; Windows 7, Windows 8, and Windows 10; MacOS 
11.6; iOS 10.3.3.  
 
3 In Android 7 there is an alternative and equally simple path which consists in “validate certificate with 
system certification authorities”. The results obtained in this case are identical to those described in the 
following.  
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Figure 2: Hardware platform implementing the evil twin used in our experiments (the battery is omitted). 
 
The legitimate network at our University is based on PEAP-MSCHAPv2, is part of eduroam and its 
SSID is ​eduroam ​. The certificate chain for the Authentication Server is composed of 3 certificates: 
● C1: a self-signed certificate of a certification authority included in the trust store of all major 
operating systems (Digicert); 
● C2: a certificate for an intermediate certification authority (GÉANT's Trusted Certificate 
Service); 
● C3: a certificate for the Authentication Server. 
Supplicants are supposed to install the correct network profile for binding this chain to the 
eduroam ​ SSID by executing an application developed by the eduroam consortium and available 
for each major operating system (​https://cat.eduroam.org/​). This application parses a configuration 
file provided by each organization to their users, usually to be downloaded from a web page. 
 
Unless differently stated, we equipped the ET with a certificate chain C1-C2-C3’, that is, a chain 
differing from the legitimate one only in the last certificate. Obtaining C3’ requires proving 
possession of a domain name within one of institutions affiliated to eduroam, which is not 
particularly difficult to achieve. In other organizations the certificate chain is rooted at a self-signed 
certificate of a certification authority managed by the organization itself, which is also the preferred 
setting for eduroam. This case will be discussed in the next section. 
 
We summarize our results in the next section. For ease of presentation, we categorize the 
behavior of Supplicants depending on whether they send credential material to the ET: 
● Secure, when the Supplicant does not validate the certificate (the outcome of an 
authentication protocol execution is A, see Figure 1). 
● Insecure, when the Supplicant sends credential information (either B or C in Figure 1). 
● UserInsecure, when the user is presented with a binary choice of the form “proceed and 
connect” vs “abort and disconnect”, the outcome depends on the actual choice and one of 
the choices leads to sending credential information (either B or C in Figure 1). 
Executions that were either Secure or Insecure complete automatically and do not require any user 
involvement. We will not specify the Android, Linux or Windows version if the corresponding result 
applies to all the versions that we have tested. 
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3.1 Supplicant behavior 
We consider Supplicants not configured with the correct network profile first. We executed a suite 
of experiments with the ET configured to use an authentication protocol different from the one of 
the legitimate network, as follows. As observed above, PEAP is a compound protocol that 
accommodates several authentication protocols to be executed within the TLS tunnel during Phase 
2. A very common option, used in our University as well, is PEAP-MSCHAPv2, in which the 
MSCHAPv2 protocol is used. This protocol provides mutual authentication and the Supplicant 
sends a hash of the user password within the tunnel. Another option is PEAP-GTC, in which the 
GTC (Generic Token Card) protocol is used. This protocol does not provide mutual authentication 
and the Supplicant sends user credentials in clear text within the tunnel. These credentials are 
meant to be obtained by the user from a token card or device in response to a challenge sent by 
the server [ABVCL04]. We configured the ET to use PEAP-GTC. The results, summarized in Table 
1 and discussed below, are similar to the finding in [SH13]. 
 
Operating System PEAP-GTC 
(Clear Text Password) 
PEAP-MSCHAPv2 
(Hashed Password) 
Correct Profile 
PEAP-MSCHAPv2 
(Hashed Password) 
Android Insecure Insecure Secure 
Linux Secure Insecure Insecure 
Windows 7 Secure Secure Secure 
Windows 8 Secure UserInsecure Secure 
Windows 10 Secure UserInsecure Secure 
macOS UserInsecure UserInsecure Secure 
iOS UserInsecure UserInsecure Secure 
Table 1: Summary of behavior for Supplicants of various operating systems that are exposed to an ET after 
having been connected with the legitimate network. 
 
Android leads to Insecure executions and sends the password ​in clear text​ without any user 
interaction. Both iOS and macOS lead to UserInsecure executions, i.e.,  the Supplicant sends the 
password ​in clear text​ but only if the user actively decides to connect.  Furthermore, with these 
three operating systems, when the Supplicant sends the password it also completes the 
authentication protocol execution successfully, that is, the Supplicant indeed establishes a network 
connection to the ET which thus may operate as a man-in-the-middle. We remark that the behavior 
observed with Android, iOS and macOS is compliant with the GTC protocol and, thus, cannot be 
attributed to an implementation mistake on the Supplicant. 
 
Linux exhibits only Secure executions because, as it turns out, the Supplicant does not accept 
using an authentication protocol different from the one used by that SSID earlier (as pointed out 
earlier, we considered Supplicants that had connected to the legitimate network already). Windows 
also exhibit only Secure executions because it does not offer native support for PEAP-GTC.  
 
We then executed a suite of experiments in which the ET was configured to use the same 
authentication protocol as the legitimate network, i.e., PEAP-MSCHAPv2 (Table 1, middle column). 
The only operating system which always leads to Secure executions is Windows 7. Linux and 
Android lead to Insecure executions. MacOS, iOS, Windows 8, Windows 10 lead to UserInsecure 
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executions. Furthermore, with MacOS and iOS, the UserInsecure executions would allow MITM 
attacks, that is, the Supplicant terminates the execution successfully. 
 
Windows 7 implements a form of trust on first use policy in which the Supplicant expects that 
certain elements of the certificate chain of the first connection be presented again at later 
connections (the root certificate C1 and the DNS name in C3): since the ET presents a chain 
without those elements, the Supplicant does not enter phase 2 of the authentication protocol.  
 
MacOS and Windows 10 implement a weaker form of trust on first use: upon receiving a different 
certificate chain, they ask the user whether to proceed by showing a window with the DNS name of 
the ET and the SSID of the network. The user may accept or refuse connection with a single click. 
We observe that, in general, users are aware of the correct SSID but they are hardly aware of the 
correct name of the authentication server. Windows 8 and iOS also lead to UserInsecure 
executions but these are less dangerous to users because, in this case, the Supplicant may 
connect to the ET only if the user ​actively ​attempts to connect to a wireless network and then 
selects the SSID of the ET. Then, the Supplicant shows a window asking the user to either accept 
or refuse to connect, as above. 
 
We now consider Supplicants configured with the correct network profile (Table 1, last column). All 
operating systems except for Linux lead to Secure executions, while Linux leads to Insecure 
executions. Furthermore, Linux leads to Insecure executions with ​any ​certificate issued by the root 
of the legitimate chain (thus a certificate that can be obtained very easily). 
 
Next, we executed several experiments with the ET equipped with a certificate chain different from 
the one considered in the previous experiments. We omit the details for brevity and report only the 
most relevant results. Linux and Android Supplicants that are not configured with the correct 
network profile, lead to Insecure executions in a variety of cases for the ET certificate: 
1. certificate issued by the root of the legitimate chain (thus a certificate that can be obtained 
very easily); 
2. self-signed certificate; 
3. certificate issued by a certification authority different from the root of the legitimate chain 
but included in the default store of the operating system. 
We note that, from an attacker point of view, all the three cases are simple to implement. 
Supplicant behavior with the other operating systems follows the same pattern as in the other 
experiments. Windows 7 implements a form of trust on first use policy, thus the Supplicant does 
not enter phase 2 of the authentication protocol whenever the certificate chain presented by the ET 
does not include the root certificate C1 and the DNS name in C3. The resulting behavior may thus 
be categorized as Secure. MacOS, iOS, Windows 8 and Windows 10 all implement a weaker form 
of trust on first use thus, upon receiving a different certificate chain, they ask the user whether to 
proceed by showing a window with the DNS name of the ET and the SSID of the network. The 
resulting behavior may thus be categorized as UserInsecure. 
 
Finally, we focussed on the scenario in which the organization runs a certification authority 
internally and anchors the certificate chain at that authority, which is also the preferred setting for 
eduroam. In this case, the behavior is as follows. 
● Supplicants that are not configured with the correct network profile exhibit the very same 
results as above: it suffices to configure the ET with a certificate that is either self-signed or 
issued by a certification authority included in the default store of the operating system. 
● Supplicants that are configured with the correct network profile also exhibit the same results 
as above, i.e., all operating systems lead to Secure executions except for Linux. The 
requirement for triggering Insecure executions on Linux would be more difficult to satisfy 
because in this case the attacker should configure the ET with a certificate issued by the 
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organization itself (the attacker should prove the need of binding a name of the organization 
to a key and then use the certified name for an ET). 
3.2 Targeted attacks 
In order to assess the practical feasibility of eliciting credential information from a ​specific ​target, 
we executed several experiments outdoor, in a region not covered by the legitimate enterprise 
network. We considered an idle attacker with an ET in a bag and a walking (voluntary) target with a 
Supplicant in his pocket. The Supplicant was not configured with the network profile and had 
connected with the legitimate network earlier, like in the previous section. 
 
When the ET was within 35 meters from the target, the Supplicant always leaked credential 
material to the ET. Attacks from larger distances did not succeed. We noticed that up to 30 meters 
every connection attempt resulted in a successful (to the attacker) execution of the authentication 
protocol, while in the range 30-35 meters some connection attempts failed but the ET managed to 
trigger a successful attempt in a few seconds nevertheless. 
 
Next, we considered a (voluntary) target driving a car with a Supplicant placed on a seat. The car 
passed in front of the idle attacker, with an ET in his bag, slowly, at a speed within city limits. The 
ET never managed to elicit credential information. A short car stop within a range of around 30 
meters from the attacker, though, was enough to leak credential information. Whether car windows 
were open or closed had no effect on the outcome. 
3.3 Non-targeted attacks 
The previous experiments have been made in a controlled environment with Supplicants under our 
full control. We executed an experiment in a real environment with a version of the ET carefully 
modified to not place any user data at risk. Specifically, we modified the sources of the logging 
module of freeradius-wpe in order to log only the following information. 
● For each successful attack: (i) time instant; (ii) hash of the username; (iii) hash of the 
institution (eduroam user identifiers take the form username@institution); (iv) a flag telling 
whether a password (GTC) or a password hash (MSCHAPv2) is obtained; (v) only in case 
the institution is our University, a flag telling whether the credentials correspond to a 
student or to a staff unit (such information can be derived from the username syntax). No 
further information was logged, in particular, neither usernames, nor passwords, nor 
password hashes were logged. 
● For each execution of the authentication protocol that terminated after receiving the user 
identity but before establishing the TLS channel (Figure 1): (i) time instant; (ii) a flag telling 
whether the Supplicant explicitly rejected the certificate sent by the ET or terminated the 
execution abruptly. The reason for the latter may include silent rejection of the certificate 
but also other reasons, including unstable network conditions and inability of the ET to 
sustain a spike in the number of concurrent executions of the authentication protocol. 
We did not attempt to track the real identity of people by other means. The log was stored on a 
flash memory card on the Raspberry executing the ET and was destroyed after summarizing its 
content as described below. 
 
We placed the ET within a bag and spent a few hours at a bus stop near our University, which is 
not covered by the legitimate network, and roaming around our campus. We found 554 different 
user identities in the log, categorized as follows: 200 with credential material (36.1%); 89 indicating 
explicit rejection by the Supplicant (16.1%); 265 indicating abrupt termination (47.8%). Credential 
material is summarized in Table 2. 
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It can be seen that we gathered 124 credentials in clear text, which would have enabled us to take 
the identity of the corresponding credentialed users without any effort, wherever username and 
password suffice to this purpose (as explained above, the ET received username and institution 
name in the clear, but we stored this information in hashed form for privacy reasons). We also 
gathered 76 MSCHAP-vs hashes: taking the identity of the corresponding credentialed users would 
have required the additional effort of guessing the corresponding passwords (Section 2.2).  
 
We emphasize again that the attack did not require any action from the users. Credentials in Table 
2 were extracted from users that: (i) happened to be within a few meters from a person with an ET 
in his bag; and, (ii) were carrying a device which had connected to eduroam in the past and was 
not configured correctly; and, (iii) the wifi interface of the device was switched on and configured 
for connecting to eduroam automatically. It is fair to claim that attacks of this kind are indeed a 
practical means for obtaining enterprise credentials.  
 
 Clear text MSCHAP-v2 hash Total 
University 
student 
101 18.2% 62 11.2% 163 29.4% 
University 
staff 
14 2.5% 10 1.8% 24 4.3% 
Other 
institutions 
9 1.6% 4 0.7% 13 2.3% 
Total  124 22.4% 76 13.7% 200 36.1% 
 
Table 2: Summary of credential material. Percentage values are computed with respect to the total number 
of authentication protocol executions for which credential material were logged. 
 
To place the figures in Table 2 in perspective, we note that the number of different user identities of 
our University that connected to the legitimate network in the timeframe of our experiment was 
around 2700, i.e., we managed to elicit credential material from about 7% of all users by just 
roaming a few hours around. It is also interesting to note that, according to the content of our log, 
the number of Supplicants that are configured correctly may be estimated in the range 15%-47%. 
While we currently have no elements for making this estimate more accurate, we believe the real 
value should be much closer to 15% than to 47%. 
3.4 Discussion 
The behaviour observed in our experiments is summarized in Table 1. We focus on Supplicants 
that are not configured correctly. With Android, an ET may elicit transmission of passwords in clear 
text without any involvement of the user and in less of a second. Android is used in smartphones, 
tablets and smartwatches, which are usually always on, with the wifi interface enabled and 
configured to connect automatically to the SSID of the enterprise network. These devices may thus 
fall prey of a successful attack virtually anywhere and anytime (at least in regions not covered by 
the legitimate network). The experiments in the previous section corroborate this claim. This risk 
level is certainly extremely high and, in our opinion, it is not emphasized adequately in the 
technical guidelines for users of wireless enterprise networks. As a side note, we note that the 
market share of Android for mobile operating systems is approximately 86% (Q1-17 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/266136/global-market-share-held-by-smartphone-operating-syst
ems/​). 
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The behaviour of Linux is very similar to that of Android, but we believe that in this case the risk 
level is smaller. While Android Supplicants may be tricked into executing the authentication 
protocol automatically and anywhere, Linux Supplicants are typically notebooks hence they are 
likely to execute the authentication protocol only when the user is engaged in a working session. 
An ET should thus be placed where users expect to be able to connect and work. Consequently, 
attacks executed outside of the enterprise are much less likely to succeed. Furthermore, an ET 
placed within the enterprise could be detected by the network administrators more easily, at least 
in principle. 
 
The risk level of Windows, macOS, iOS is, broadly speaking, similar: successful attacks always 
require a form of user involvement. In this respect, the risk level is relatively small because of 
reasons similar to those of Linux: successful attacks may occur only when and where the user 
expects to be able to connect. 
4 Countermeasures 
A classification of countermeasures to ET-based attacks for the broader category of wireless local 
networks, i.e., even for those that do not implement WPA2 Enterprise authentication, can be found 
in [LPPE14]. Typical approaches aim at detecting an ET in operation by uncovering forms of traffic 
anomalies at various levels of the network stack. With respect to the specific scenario of our 
interest, though, such countermeasures are not effective as they cannot prevent Supplicants to 
initiate an authentication protocol execution with an ET. Most importantly, detecting an ET that may 
be placed virtually anywhere, i.e., even outside of the targeted organization, is extremely hard. 
 
We may identify only two technical countermeasures that can be taken in the short term to mitigate 
the risks described in the previous sections. First, multi-factor authentication should be deployed 
for enterprise services. Second, the password policy should allow only passwords that provide a 
strong resistance to offline guessing attacks. Although these measures are highly useful in general, 
they are made even more desirable by the fact that, as it turns out, obtaining credential information 
with an ET is both simple and attractive to attackers. We remark that these countermeasures can 
only mitigate the effects of a successful attack. There is no way for making sure that Supplicants 
will not leak credential material to an ET, other than configuring the correct network profile on the 
Supplicant before connecting. 
 
A further option that, in principle, could be considered is the usage of different passwords for 
network access and for access to the other enterprise services. This choice would be a step back 
from SSO and would certainly introduce additional complexity and inconvenience. On the other 
hand, it would also have significant security advantages. First and foremost, the value of network 
credentials for attackers would diminish, thereby making the attacks considered in this work less 
attractive. Second, it would introduce an important compartmentalization in the enterprise 
architecture. Overall, though, we believe that the resulting hassle to IT staff and users would be too 
high to make this option practically viable. 
 
More effective countermeasures would require significant changes in protocols, Supplicants, 
access points and authorization servers. Leaving technical details aside, the number of different 
actors and interests involved would make such an endeavor extremely difficult. For example, an 
interesting proposal that did not gain much traction consisted in using certificates for binding the 
SSID of the network to the public key of the Authorization Server, much like HTTPS certificates 
bind DNS names to the public key of the corresponding web server [BCT11]. Such an approach 
would enable an out of the box Supplicant to securely connect to a specified SSID. On the other 
hand, an actual implementation of the proposal would have required  the definition of a global 
namespace for SSID, the cooperation of certification authorities and significant modifications to 
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networking devices. Another proposal suggested to formalize a form of trust-on-first-use policy: 
assuming that the first connection with a given SSID is established with a legitimate Authorization 
Server, subsequent connections with that SSID may only be established with an entity with the 
same public key [GBLMS10]. Indeed, security policies based on trust-on-first-use have been 
recently proposed for HTTPS [EPS15]. On the other hand, in addition to the problem of upgrading 
the networking infrastructure, there is a crucial and difficult to solve problem in this area: how to 
enable the legitimate server to modify its keys prior to the planned expiration date without incurring 
the risk of becoming isolated from many of its clients. 
 
The Wi-Fi Alliance has recently proposed a standard for enabling secure, cellular-style roaming for 
wireless networks that is built upon WPA2 Enterprise [WF16]. Public hotspots belong to a global 
infrastructure potentially distributed around the world. Supplicants may authenticate to hotspots 
either with a SIM, or with a certificate, or with a username/password pair. The configuration 
problem for out of the box Supplicants that authenticate with username and password has been 
solved by assuming that all “Passpoint certified” Supplicants: (i) will be equipped out of the box 
with the certificate of a certain certification authority specified in the standard; and, (ii) will connect 
to Passpoint-enabled networks only when receiving a certificate chain whose root is that authority. 
It remains to be seen whether this approach will be really effective and how Supplicants that are 
not Passpoint certified will be handled. Indeed, commercial implementations of such cellular-style 
wifi roaming are already available and in those cases Supplicants may connect only after installing 
a dedicated ​application​ (see, e.g., ​http://www.ipass.com​). 
4.1 A more radical proposal 
A direction that, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been explored consists in modifying the 
model of enterprise wireless networks presented to users. Today the Supplicant presents a list of 
in range SSIDs; the user selects the SSID of interest and the Supplicant connects to that SSID; the 
user may instruct the Supplicant to connect again to a specified SSID automatically. This model 
applies to all kinds of wireless networks: open networks, networks protected with WPA Personal 
(i.e., the same password is shared by all devices) and networks protected with WPA2 Enterprise). 
We propose to investigate a different framework, as follows. 
 
The Supplicant maintains ​two ​separate lists of networks with which automatic connection is 
possible: one for open networks and for WPA Personal networks; another for WPA2 Enterprise 
networks. The former is managed as it is today, while the latter is managed with the following rules: 
1. Networks in the list are described by a pair <SSID, AS name>. The list cannot contain 
multiple pairs with the same SSID. 
2. The Supplicant may connect automatically with a WPA2 Enterprise network only if the 
network is in the list. 
3. The list is initially empty. Insertion and removal may be done only by the user. Insertion 
may occur in only two ways: 
a. the user specifies SSID and AS name (for example, by typing in a form in a GUI of 
the Supplicant); or, 
b. the user asks the Supplicant to explore the networks in range and selects one of the 
SSIDs; the Supplicant initiates the authentication protocol, obtains the AS name and 
asks the user whether the corresponding <SSID, AS name> pair should be inserted 
in the list. 
4. Certificate validation can never be skipped. 
5. Certificate chains rooted at a self-signed certificate that is not in the store of the Supplicant 
are treated as follows: the root certificate must be accepted by the user upon inserting the 
SSID in the list; later connections with the same <SSID, AS name> pair must occur with the 
same chain; and, the root certificate can be used only for that pair, i.e., it cannot be used for 
certifying the chain of other enterprise networks or of other entities. 
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As an example, consider an out of the box Supplicant. The Supplicant could not connect 
automatically with any enterprise wireless network. Configuration for the enterprise network at our 
University, with SSID ​eduroam ​and Authorization Server named ​raggio.units.it ​, would 
occur with procedure 3-a (procedure 3-b will be discussed later). When in range of the SSID 
eduroam ​, the Supplicant would then start the WPA2 Enterprise authentication protocol 
automatically but would enter Phase 2 of the protocol only upon receipt of a valid certificate for the 
DNS name ​raggio.units.it ​. 
 
In this new scenario, an ET could receive credential material only in these cases: (i) the Supplicant 
enters in range of the ET ​before ​connecting with the legitimate network; and (ii-a) the ET has a 
self-signed certificate accepted by the user; or, (ii-b) the ET has a chain rooted at a certification 
authority issuing fraudulent certificates. The resulting scenario would not be foolproof, but the bar 
would be much higher than it is today. 
 
Indeed, the resulting scenario would be aligned to the higher security level currently available for 
HTTPS. Consider an out of the box device. A user that knows the name of an HTTPS web server 
may connect the device to that server securely: the only risks would be (i) and (ii-a)/(ii-b) above. 
Out of the box devices can thus be considered as being ​secure by default​ with respect to HTTPS 
usage, in the sense that they do not need any specific configuration for connecting to a named 
server securely. In contrast, with current technology, a user that knows the name of a WPA2 
Enterprise network (i.e., its SSID) ​cannot ​connect the device to that network securely. The 
proposed approach, thus, would provide an uniform and more secure framework for out of the box 
Supplicants. Figure 3 shows a possible graphical interface for the proposed model. 
 
Key advantages of the proposed approach are: 
● Out of the box Supplicants would be secure by default, in the sense just described, with 
respect to WPA2 Enterprise wireless network connection. 
● Modifications would be needed ​only ​on the Supplicants, at least in principle. No changes on 
networking devices or protocols would be required. 
● No changes on certificate structure or management would be required either: Supplicants 
would use the very same rules and certificate types that are used today for binding a public 
key to a server name. 
● Deployment and upgrade could be incremental: Supplicants offering the new user interface 
(and stronger security) could co-exist with traditional Supplicants. 
● It would accommodate existing large-scale roaming services such as eduroam and 
Passpoint without any change, at least in principle. The reason is because Supplicants 
establish a TLS tunnel with the Authorization Server of their home institution, as identified in 
the early stage of the authentication protocol, irrespective of their actual location. 
 
The description so far assumes that users connect only through procedure 3-a, which requires 
users to know the name of the Authorization Server in advance. Satisfying this requirement could 
be exceedingly difficult for some organizations or for some users. For this reason, procedure 3-b 
makes it possible to connect even in the way familiar to the user, by exploring the networks in 
range and selecting the desired SSID. This option clearly introduces a further risk, i.e., an ET 
impersonating the desired SSID could receive credential material also in case: (i) the Supplicant 
enters in range of the ET ​before ​connecting with the legitimate network; and (ii-c) the ET has a 
valid certificate for a name different from the name of the legitimate AS. 
 
We emphasize that even with procedure 3-b the resulting scenario would be arguably more secure 
than it typically is today because the Supplicant would have to enter in range of the ET and to 
actively decide to connect ​before ​having connected to the legitimate network. Furthermore, in that 
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case, the Supplicant would not be able to connect to the legitimate network and thus would have 
no wireless connectivity within the enterprise (unless the Supplicant remained permanently in 
coverage of the ET). This fact would make it possible, at least potentially, to realize that something 
wrong has occurred. Note also that the network list would contain the name of the AS of the ET, 
which would certainly be different from the name of the legitimate AS because the ET exhibited a 
valid certificate for its (fraudulent) AS. 
 
Finally, we observe that Procedure 3-b is not an essential component of the proposed approach. 
Procedures 3-a and 3-b support two different security/usability trade-offs, in which the latter is 
simpler to use and more similar to the interaction model currently used. While the proposed 
approach would constitute a significant departure from a simple and established model presented 
to users, we believe the resulting security improvement make the proposal worth investigating. 
 
 
Figure 3 A possible interface for the proposed model. This screen displays the wi-fi networks with which 
automatic connection is possible. WPA2 Enterprise networks are clearly separated from the other networks 
and identified with explicit visibility for the AS name. The “add network” functionality, not shown, shall also 
handle WPA2 Enterprise networks differently from the other networks, as described in the main text. 
 
5 Conclusions 
WPA2 Enterprise Supplicants that authenticate with username and password and that are 
configured with the minimal options necessary for connecting to the wireless enterprise network, 
are at risk of leaking credentials virtually anywhere and anytime. We have shown that this risk is 
not a mere theoretical possibility. On the contrary, it can be exploited easily, cheaply, quickly and 
with high probability of success. Convergence of organizations toward SSO architectures in which 
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a single set of credentials unlock access to all services of the organizations, coupled with the 
ubiquitous availability of wifi-enabled personal devices which often contain enterprise credentials, 
have made attacks of this sort particularly attractive to attackers and hard to detect. 
 
It would be easy to dismiss our concerns as well known technical issues, or as an obvious 
consequence of wrong user behavior, or as an unsurprising side effect of ineffective IT 
management policy, or as yet another of the many security vulnerabilities of today’s technology. 
We believe such an attitude would be wrong: people are not supposed to be aware of technical 
issues of this sort and we, as a technical community, should definitely provide them with devices 
that are secure even out of the box. In our opinion, a technology that in many, if not most, of its 
practical deployments puts enterprise credentials at risk is no longer acceptable. 
 
Solving the corresponding problems in order to provide solutions that are both practical and more 
secure is much easier said than done, because such an effort would require commitment and 
involvement of a number of different actors, usually with competing interests. However, the 
community should at the minimum acknowledge that there is a security problem in a fundamental 
technology and express loudly that magnitude and extension of this problem are underestimated.  
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